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 Clean Air Council v. Pruitt, 862 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2017) 
 
Oliver Wood 
 
 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
granted a motion for summary vacatur against the Environmental 
Protection Agency after environmental groups challenged the agency’s 
reconsideration of the Obama-era methane rule under the Clean Air Act. 
The court held that the EPA unlawfully issued a stay after it reconsidered 
the rule without proper authorization. The court vacated the EPA’s stay, 
one example of the Trump Administration unsuccessfully repealing 
Obama-era rulemaking.  
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
   
 The court in Clean Air Council v. Pruitt granted Clean Air Council’s 
(“Environmental Petitioners”) motion to vacate the ninety-day stay 
implemented by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) 
regarding the final methane rule (“Rule”).1 The Environmental 
Petitioners claimed that under the Clean Air Act Section 307(d)(7)(B) 
(“Section 307”), the EPA lacked authority to implement the stay.2 The 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed with the 
Environmental Petitioners, concluding that the Section 307 did not 
authorize the EPA to stay the rule because reconsideration of the rule 
was not mandatory, given how extensively the issues under 
reconsideration had been addressed in the proposed rule.3 Subsequently, 
the court granted the Environmental Petitioners motion for summary 
vacatur, reinstating the Obama-era rule until the EPA complies with the 
appropriate procedural requirements to reconsider the rule.4 
 
II.   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 In June 2016, the EPA issued its final rule, implementing “new 
source performance standards” governing the fugitive emissions of 
methane gas in the oil and natural gas industries.5 The rule took effect on 
August 2, 2016.6 Absent the stay, regulated entities would have had to 
complete their initial monitoring surveys by June 3 and repair any leaks 
within thirty days.7  
 After the EPA published the final rule, a group of petroleum industry 
associations (“Industry Petitioners”) filed an administrative petition, 
                                                             
 1.  Clean Air Council v. Pruitt, 862 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
2.   Id. at 4. 
3.  Id.   
4.   Id. at 14.  
5.  Id. at 4 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 60.5397a(f) (2016)). 
6.  Id. 
 7.  Id.  
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which sought to reconsider the rule under Section 307.8  Section 307 
mandates that if the petitioner can show the “Administrator that [1] it 
was impracticable to raise such objection within [the notice and comment 
period] . . . and [2] if such objection is of central relevance to the 
outcome of the rule, the Administrator shall convene a proceeding for 
reconsideration of the rule . . . .”9 Additionally, the EPA or court may 
stay the rule for up to three months while the reconsideration 
proceedings occur.10  
 The Industry Petitioners sought a stay pending reconsideration.11 
They argued the EPA must reconsider the rule because several provisions 
included in the final rule were not included in the proposed rule, which 
meant they could not participate in the public comment period, as 
required by the CAA.12 
 In April of 2017, the EPA recognized one of the Industry Petitioner’s 
objections warranted reconsideration.13 The EPA ordered a temporary 
ninety-day stay on June 5, 2017, which retroactively went into effect on 
June 2, 2017; the day before the rule required industry to implement their 
monitoring systems and repair leaks.14 On June 16, 2017, the EPA 
published their intent to further look at the rule and extended the stay for 
two years.15 
 The Environmental Petitioners filed suit in the United States Court of 
Appeals, District of Columbia, seeking either an emergency stay or a 
summary vacatur.16 The Environmental Petitioners argued that the EPA’s 
stay violated the CAA because the issues the EPA raised regarding the 
rule were addressed, and heavily deliberated, during the comment 
period.17 The EPA contended, as did intervening Industry Petitioners, 
that the court lacks jurisdiction over the matter and the stay is lawful 
under the CAA.18 
 
III.   ANALYSIS 
 
 Two primary issues were raised for the court. First, the EPA and 
Industry Petitioners contended the reconsideration of the rule was 
unreviewable by the court, because the rule was not a final agency 
action, and thus the court lacked jurisdiction.19 Second, the 
Environmental Petitioners argued the CAA did not authorize the EPA to 
                                                             
8.   Id. at 4 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B)(2017)). 
9.  Id. at 5 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B)). 
10.   Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B)). 
11.  Id.   
12.   Id. 
 13.   Id.  
14.  Id.   
15.  Id. (citing 82 Fed. Reg. 27,645 (June 16, 2017)). 
16.  Id. at 6.   
17.  Id.     
18.  Id. 
19.  Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1)). 
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issue a ninety-day stay because reconsideration of the rule was not 
mandatory.20  
 
A.   Jurisdiction Argument 
 
 The court first determined whether the EPA’s reconsideration of the 
rule created a final agency action that allowed the court to review the 
action.21 A final agency action “mark[s] the consummation of the 
agency's decisionmaking [sic] process” and is “one by which rights or 
obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will 
flow.”22 Ultimately, the court concluded that because the EPA’s decision 
to grant reconsideration could also result in no change to the rule, the 
reconsideration was not the final agency action.23 
 However, the court interpreted the stay of the rule—which postponed 
the rule’s compliance deadline—as analogous to a final agency action.24  
Because the EPA changed the date for compliance, the court found it 
equal to amending or revoking the rule.25 In prior cases, the D.C. Circuit 
held: “[S]uspension of the permit process . . . amounts to a suspension of 
the effective date of regulation . . .  and may be reviewed in the court of 
appeals as the promulgation of a regulation.”26 Thus, the court rejected 
the EPA’s assertion that it lacked jurisdiction over the reconsideration of 
the rule because the stay was effectively final agency action.27 
 Furthermore, contrary to the arguments of the EPA, the court 
specifically highlighted Section 307, which gives the court the power to 
issue a stay, and therefore should also give it power to deny a stay.28 The 
court noted that without the ability to deny a stay, the situation would 
arise with the “perverse result of empowering this court to act when the 
agency denies a stay but not when it chooses to grant one.”29 
 
B.   Decision to Reconsider 
 
 The court concluded—in agreement with the Environmental 
Petitioners—that the EPA’s decision to issue the ninety-day stay was 
unauthorized under the CAA.30 First, while the EPA suggested it has 
“broad discretion” to reconsider rules, the court highlighted the EPA’s 
non-compliance with the Administrative Procedures Act, which required 
                                                             
20.  Id. at 8.  
21.   Id. 
22.   Id. at 6 (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78, 117 S. Ct. 
1154, 137 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1997)). 
23.  Id.  
24.  Id.  
25.  Id.  
26.  Id. (quoting Council of Southern Mountains, Inc. v. Donovan, 653 
F.2d 573, 579 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). 
27.  Id. at 7.  
28.   Id. 
29.  Id.  
30.  Id. at 8.  
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appropriate notice and comment periods.31 Second, the EPA contended it 
had “inherent authority” to “issue a brief stay.”32 The court disagreed, 
noting that the EPA must comply with the statute, and Section 307 does 
not give the EPA authority to stay the rule unless the reconsideration was 
mandatory.33 
 Because the EPA’s stay was only lawful if the reconsideration was 
mandatory, the court reviewed whether the EPA’s stay met the two 
requirements in order to reconsider.34 First, the EPA had to prove it was 
impracticable for the Industry Petitioners to object during the public 
comment period.35 Second, the EPA had to demonstrate the objection 
was “of central relevance to the outcome of the rule.”36  
     The court used the arbitrary and capricious standard of review to 
determine whether the EPA met the two requirements of 
reconsideration.37 The decision hinged on whether the final rule was “a 
logical outgrowth” of the proposed rule.38 The final rule “fails the logical 
outgrowth test” if “interested parties would have had to divine the 
agency's unspoken thoughts, because the final rule was surprisingly 
distant from the proposed rule.”39  
 The court examined the record and determined that the Industry 
Petitioners had ample opportunity to participate in the comment period.40 
In three instances, the final rule set forth by the EPA responded directly 
to the comments and information the EPA later said was “impracticable” 
for Industry Petitioners to comment on.41 These public comments proved 
to the court that it was not impracticable for the Industry Petitioners to 
object within the public comment period, which meant the first 
requirement for reconsideration was not met, thus the stay was 
unauthorized.42 Without authorization for the stay, the EPA acted in 
excess of its statutory authority, and the decision to impose the stay was 
arbitrary and capricious.43 The court did not need to discuss the second 
requirement for consideration because the first was not met.44 
 The dissent challenged the majority’s opinion that the stay was “final 
agency action.”45 The dissenting judge reasoned that “hitting the pause 
                                                             
31.  Id. at 9 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 553). 
32.   Id.  
33.  Id. at 10.  
34.  Id.   
35.   Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B)). 
36.  Id.  
37.  Id.   
38.  Id.  
39.  Id. (quoting CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Surface Transportation 
Board, 584 F.3d 1076, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).   
40.  Id. at 13. 
41.  Id. at 11.  
42.  Id. at 14.  
43.   Id.  
44.  Id.   
 45.   Id. at 15. 
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button [was] the antithesis of ending the matter,”46 and that Section 307 
clearly states that the agency can stay the effectiveness of the rule during 
reconsideration.47  
 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
 
 The EPA’s action in Clean Air Council was an example of the 
Trump Administration’s effort to repeal Obama-era agency rule making. 
Although the court granted summary vacatur to the Environmental 
Petitioners, the EPA can proceed with its June 16, 2017 Notice for 
Proposed Rulemaking, so long as “the new policy is permissible under 
the statute . . ., there are good reasons for it, and . . . the agency believes 
it to be better.”48 
 
                                                             
 46.  Id.   
 47.   Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B)). 
48.  Id. (quoting F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc, 556 U.S. 502, 
515 (2009)).  
